The rate of interest as a macroeconomic distribution parameter: Horizontalism and Post-Keynesian models of distribution of growth by Hein, Eckhard
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The rate of interest as a macroeconomic
distribution parameter: Horizontalism
and Post-Keynesian models of
distribution of growth
Eckhard Hein
Institute for International Political Economy, Berlin School of
Economics and Law
June 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23372/
MPRA Paper No. 23372, posted 22. June 2010 16:05 UTC
The rate of interest as a macroeconomic distribution parameter: Horizontalism and 
Post-Keynesian models of distribution of growth*
 
Eckhard Hein 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We review the main arguments put forward against the horizontalist view of endogenous 
credit and money and an exogenous rate of interest under the control of monetary policies. 
We argue that the structuralist arguments put forward in favour of an endogenously increasing 
interest rate when investment and economic activity are rising, due to increasing indebtedness 
of the firm sector or decreasing liquidity in the commercial bank sector, raise major doubts 
from a macroeconomic perspective. This is shown by means of examining the effect of 
increasing capital accumulation on the debt-capital ratio of the firm sector in a simple 
Kaleckian distribution and growth model. In particular we show that rising (falling) capital 
accumulation may be associated with a falling (rising) debt-capital ratio for the economy as a 
whole and hence with the ‘paradox of debt’. Therefore, the treatment of the rate of interest as 
an exogenous macroeconomic distribution parameter in Post-Keynesian distribution and 
growth models seems to be well founded.  
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1. Introduction 
The introduction of monetary variables into Post-Keynesian models of distribution and 
growth has been an ongoing process since the late 1980s/early 1990s.1 Until then the impacts 
of monetary variables were rarely considered to be relevant for the equilibrium solutions in 
the models built in the tradition of Kaldor (1955/56, 1957, 1961) and Robinson (1956, 1962), 
on the one hand, and Kalecki (1954) as well as Steindl (1952), on the other.2 For more than 
two decades now Post-Keynesians have increasingly taken Keynes’s (1933) research 
programme of a ‘monetary theory of production’ more and more seriously and have 
introduced monetary variables into the Kaldorian and Kaleckian variants of the Post-
Keynesian growth and distribution models.3
Monetary extensions of Post-Keynesian models of distribution and growth usually 
follow the Post-Keynesian ‘horizontalist’ view, as developed by Kaldor (1970, 1982, 1985), 
Lavoie (1984, 1992a, pp. 149-216, 1996, 1999, 2006) and Moore (1988, 1989), and assume 
that the interest rate is an exogenous variable for the accumulation process, whereas the 
quantities of credit and money are determined endogenously by economic activity and 
payment conventions. 
                                                 
1 An exception, perhaps, was Pasinetti’s (1974, pp. 139-141) natural rate of growth model in which the 
normal rate of profit is positively associated with the rate of interest as long as the latter is smaller than 
the former. 
2 See Lavoie (1992a, pp. 282-347) and Hein (2004, pp. 149-219) for surveys of 
Kaldorian/Robinsonian and Kaleckian models of distribution and growth. For Kaleckian models see 
also the overview by Blecker (2002). For more recent developments in Post-Keynesian distribution 
and growth models see the contributions in Setterfield (2010). 
3 See the overview in Lavoie (1995) and Hein (2008) and the contributions by, among others, Dutt 
(1989, 1992, 1995), Dutt/Amadeo (1993), Epstein (1992, 1994), Hein (1999, 2006a, 2006b, 2007), 
Hein/Ochsen (2003), Hein/Schoder (2010), Lavoie (1992a, pp. 347-371, 1993, 1995), Lavoie/Godley 
(2001-2), Lavoie/Rodriguez/Seccareccia (2004), Lima/Meirelles (2006), Smithin (1997, 2003a, pp. 
131-151, 2003b), and Taylor (1985, 2004, pp. 272-278). 
 2
However, the validity of the ‘horizontalist’ view has been questioned by those Post-
Keynesian authors following the ‘structuralists’ view, for instance Arestis/Howells (1996, 
1999), Dow (2006), Howells (1995a, 1995b, 2006), Palley (1994, 1996), and Wray (1990, 
1992a, 1992b, 1995). According to this view, also the rate of interest should be considered to 
be an endogenous variable which is dependent on the development of economic activity, in 
particular on the demand for credit associated with higher investment or capital accumulation. 
From this view it would follow that an endogenous rate of interest should be included in Post-
Keynesian distribution and growth models, too. 
In the present paper, we will compare the ‘horizontalist’ to the ‘structuralist’ monetary 
view in the second section, and we will review an attempt at reconciliation of these two 
views. We will argue that the arguments in favour of an endogenously increasing rate of 
interest, put forward in the ‘structuralist’ view and in the attempt at reconciliation, have not 
been convincing from a macroeconomic perspective. In the third section we will make use of 
a simple Kaleckian distribution model with an endogenous debt-capital ratio of the firm sector 
in the medium run, as developed in Hein (2006), and we will show that an increasing 
inducement to accumulate at the firm level will not necessarily be associated with rising debt-
capital ratios at the macroeconomic level. Taking into account the macroeconomic feedbacks 
there is thus no reason to believe that the loan rates of interest will go up due to increasing 
indebtedness of this sector when the inducement to invest of the firm sector rises. The final 
section will summarise and conclude. 
 
2. Horizontalism versus structuralism4
In Post-Keynesian distribution and growth models relying on the independence of investment 
from saving also in the long period, firms’ investment finance and finance costs have to be 
                                                 
4 This section draws on chapter 6.5 of my book on „Money, Distribution Conflict and Capital 
Accumulation“ (Hein 2008). 
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treated explicitly. In a credit money economy, external finance for firms’ investment can be 
supplied either by those households holding financial wealth or by the banking sector. But it 
is only the banking sector, consisting of a central bank and commercial banks, which is 
capable of supplying any creditworthy credit demand at a given rate of interest without limits, 
in principle. In Post-Keynesian monetary theory, the volume of credit (as a flow) and the 
quantity of money (as a stock) are therefore endogenous to the income generation and 
accumulation process.5 The volume of credit supply is determined by credit demand which 
commercial banks consider creditworthy, that is by the credit demand of those debtors who 
are able to supply securities accepted by the central bank as collateral when providing 
commercial banks with central bank money in the money market. Loan demand which 
commercial banks deem creditworthy is granted, deposits are created with commercial banks, 
and the central bank accommodates the demand for the required amount of central bank 
money. The central bank also has to take the role of a ‘lender of last resort’ and is responsible 
for sustaining the liquidity of the monetary system. The central bank determines the price for 
central bank money, the base rate of interest, and commercial banks mark-up this base rate 
when supplying credit to investors. 
There are, however, two major issues in Post-Keynesian monetary economics, 
discussed under the labels ‘horizontalists’ (or ‘accommodationists’) versus ‘structuralists’, 
which have yet remained unsolved.6 The first issue is related to the central bank’s supply 
curve of reserves in base interest rate-central bank money space and hence to the degree of 
central bank accommodation of reserves. The second is related to the commercial banks’ 
supply curve in market interest rate-credit space and to the relevance and uniqueness of 
                                                 
5 On endogenous money in Post-Keynesian theory see Cottrell (1994), Fontana (2003, 2004a, 2009), 
Hewitson (1995), Howells (1995b), Lavoie (1984, 1992a, pp. 149-216, 1994), Moore (1989), Rochon 
(1999, 2001), and Smithin (2003a, pp. 98-104, pp. 121-127). 
6 On the discussion between ‘horizontalists’ and ‘structuralists’ see the surveys by Fontana (2003, 
2004a, 2009), Palley (1994, 1996), and Pollin (1991). 
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changes in commercial banks’ liquidity preferences and risk assessments when credit demand 
expands. 
 
2.2 The horizontalist view 
In the horizontalist view, pioneered by Kaldor (1970, 1982, 1985), Lavoie (1984) and Moore 
(1988, 1989),7 it is argued that the central bank’s monetary policy determines the base rate of 
interest and that the central bank as ‘lender of last resort’ is responsible for the liquidity and 
stability of the monetary system as a whole. Therefore, the central bank fully accommodates 
the generation of credit and hence deposits with commercial banks by supplying the required 
amount of central bank money, provided that commercial banks only grant credit to 
creditworthy borrowers. This implies that there is always some sort of ‘rationing’, in the sense 
that the willingness to pay the rate of interest demanded by the central bank is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for commercial banks to get hold of reserves.8 Within this limit, 
however, the central banks’ money supply curve becomes horizontal. 
Commercial banks determine the interest rate in the credit market by marking up the 
central bank’s base rate, and then supply credit at this rate to those borrowers whom they 
consider to be creditworthy. Banks are therefore price makers and quantity takers, within the 
limits given by creditworthiness. Again, the willingness of firms and households to pay the 
rate of interest set by banks in the credit market is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition 
to obtain credit, and there will always be some sort of ‘credit rationing’ for those who are 
unable to provide required collateral (Wolfson 1996). The commercial banks’ mark-up on the 
                                                 
7 Major elements of the horizontalist view have already been developed by Le Bourva in the French 
debate of the 1950s as Lavoie (1992b) has argued. On an English translation of this contribution see 
Le Bourva (1992). 
8 See Wolfson (1996) for an elaboration of a Post-Keynesian theory of credit rationing based on 
asymmetric expectations of borrowers and lenders in a world with fundamental uncertainty. Credit 
rationing may occur due to differences in expectations between borrowers and lenders. 
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base rate is determined by their risk and liquidity considerations, and also by the degree of 
competition in the commercial banking sector. In this approach, liquidity preference 
determines the structure of interest rates, and not the level of interest rates. The commercial 
banks’ liquidity preference is a determinant of the mark-up and hence the spread between the 
base rate and the market rate of interest. 
‘Briefly put, a generalised liquidity preference theory tells us to what extent the 
various agents in the economy are ready to become illiquid and to abandon liquid 
assets (...). The central bank determines the base rate, and all other rates are adjusted 
to that rate, through liquidity preference or other considerations. Liquidity preference 
does not determine the rate of interest, (...). Rather liquidity preference determines the 
differential between the base rate and all the other rates.’ (Lavoie 1996, p. 293, italics 
in the original) 
The horizontalist view can be presented graphically, adopting Palley’s (1994, p. 74) 
approach in Figure 1. The upper left quadrant shows the central bank’s horizontal base money 
supply curve (MS) at a given base rate of interest (iCB) set by the central bank. In the upper 
right quadrant we find the interest rate inverse loan demand curve (LD) and the horizontal loan 
supply curve (LS) of commercial banks at a given rate of interest (iB) calculated by marking 
up the central bank’s base rate [iB = (1+mB)iCB]. The mark-up (mB) is determined by 
commercial banks’ risk and liquidity premia, and by the degree of competition in the banking 
sector. The lower right quadrant with the loan-deposit curve (LD) shows that ‘loans (L) make 
deposits (D)’, and the lower left quadrant with the deposit-reserves curve (DM) displays that 
‘deposits (D) make reserves (M)’. For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that each ‘making’ 
takes place in fixed proportions. The loan-deposit- and the deposit-reserves curves will be 
affected by the deposit-loan-ratio, by the required reserve ratios for deposits, and by excess 
reserves (Palley 1994). 
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Figure 1: The horizontalist approach of endogenous money and credit 
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An increase in loan demand, hence an outward shift in the loan demand curve, will 
increase loan and money supply at given interest rates, provided the loan demand is deemed 
creditworthy by commercial banks. Higher standards for creditworthiness associated with a 
more cautious credit supply will be associated with a downward shift in the loan demand 
curve in Figure 1. 
If liquidity preference and risk considerations of private banks and, hence, their mark-
ups remain constant, the central bank’s interest rate setting in the base money market also 
determines the market rate of interest in the credit market (Smithin 2003a, pp. 121-127). 
Under these conditions, changes in the base rate and in the credit market rate of interest are 
due to changes in the monetary policy stance. Changes in the central bank’s base rate will 
therefore also shift the credit supply curve and affect credit demand and hence real economic 
activity financed by credit. 
However, if commercial banks’ liquidity and risk considerations or the degree of 
competition, and hence their mark-ups, change in the face of a changing base rate of interest, 
monetary policy may not be able to determine the credit market rate of interest directly. Here 
an asymmetry may arise: An increasing base rate of interest will always trigger an increasing 
credit market rate, because commercial banks have to recover costs of refinancing and have to 
gain (minimum) profits. But a decreasing base rate may not be followed immediately by a 
falling credit market rate, if commercial banks’ liquidity and risk premia increase due to rising 
uncertainty, or if banks’ profit aspirations increase. Note finally, that the horizontalist view 
does not imply that monetary policy is free to set the rate of interest at whatever level, 
irrespective of economic conditions. On the contrary, modern central banks have used the 
interest rate tool in order to stabilize inflation – and/or the exchange rate, depending on the 
exchange rate regime.9
                                                 
9 For an analysis of the limited effectiveness of inflation targeting monetary policies within Kaleckian 
monetary distribution and growth models see Hein (2006b, 2008) and Hein/Stockhammer (2010). 
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2.2 The structuralist view 
Post-Keynesian structuralists share the view that money is endogenous and that the central 
bank uses the base rate of interest as an economic policy instrument. But they object to the 
money and credit supply curves being perfectly elastic and argue that also the rate of interest 
becomes an endogenous variable.10 First, it is argued, central banks may not always 
accommodate rising bank loans with the required amount of central bank money at a given 
rate of interest. Therefore, commercial banks may be forced to attract reserves from the public 
or to introduce financial innovations. The rate of interest will hence have to rise in order to 
make economic agents part with central bank money, and the money and credit supply curves 
become upwards sloping. Households’ liquidity preference becomes important again in 
determining the levels of the money and the loan rates of interest. This is shown in Figure 2 
adopted from Palley (1994, p. 75). 
Even if the central bank fully accommodates the commercial banks’ demand for 
money, structuralists put forward arguments in favour of a rising credit supply curve in 
interest rate credit space. Expanding credit decreases commercial banks’ liquidity position 
and increases firms’ degree of indebtedness, it is argued. Increasing credit supply is hence 
associated with increasing liquidity and risk premia of commercial banks. Liquidity 
preference and increasing risk induce commercial banks to increase the mark-up on the base 
rate when credit supply is expanded. Contrary to the horizontalist view, liquidity preference 
has again a role to play in the determination of the level and the time paths of the market rates 
of interest. This is shown in Figure 3. 
                                                 
10 See for instance Herr (1988, 1993), Howells (1995a, 1995b), Minsky (1975), Palley (1994, 1996), 
and Wray (1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1995). 
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Figure 2: The structuralist approach with incomplete accommodation of the central bank 
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Figure 3: The structuralist approach with complete accommodation of the central bank 
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2.3 Fontana’s reconciliation 
Fontana (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2009) has recently tried to reconcile the horizontalist and the 
structuralist approaches to endogenous money. Following a distinction made by Hicks (1982), 
Fontana argues that horizontalists have put forward a ‘single period analysis’ with given 
expectations, and hence given liquidity preferences and risk assessments of commercial banks 
and the central bank. Structuralists are said to pursue a ‘continuation analysis’ of money in 
which expectations, and hence liquidity preference and risk assessments, may change period 
by period. The effects of changing expectations on money and loan rates of interest are 
therefore integrated into the analysis. Therefore, the difference between the horizontalist and 
the structuralist approach boils down to different assumptions about the state of expectations, 
Fontana argues. Since the structuralist approach covers more than a single period, it is 
considered to encompass the horizontalist view and to be able to generate a richer and more 
complex explanation of credit and money supply. This is shown in Figure 4 adopted from 
Fontana (2004a, p. 374). 
Assuming first that the central bank fully accommodates the commercial banks’ 
demand for central bank money, an increase in creditworthy loan demand from LD1 in period 
1 to LD2 in period 2 is considered. In period 1 firms’ loan demand is met by a horizontal credit 
supply curve at a given interest rate iB1 calculated as a mark-up on the base rate iCB. Note that 
credit supply at this rate is not infinite. An increase in credit demand and hence a shift in the 
loan demand curve from LD1 to LD2 is assumed to be associated with a decrease in the 
commercial banks’ liquidity position and an increase in the degree of indebtedness of firms, 
according to the structuralist view. Liquidity and risk considerations induce commercial banks 
to increase the mark-up on the central bank’s base rate, so that the loan rate moves to iB2. A 
rise in credit demand is therefore associated with an increase in the loan rate of interest. 
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Figure 4: A time framework explanation of endogenous money with complete accommodation 
of the central bank 
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A similar exercise can be undertaken with respect to the base interest rate set by the 
central bank in the face of a rise in the demand for central bank money in Figure 5. If the 
central bank decides not to accommodate a rising demand for reserves triggered by an 
increasing demand for loans, the supply functions of central bank money and of loans both 
shift upwards. An increasing demand for loans and reserves will only be supplied at 
increasing interest rates. The central bank’s base rate for reserves rises from iCB1 to iCB2, and 
the loan rate increases from iB1 to iB2. The increase in the loan rate may even exceed the 
increase in the base rate due to ‘increasing risk’. 
Indeed, Fontana’s contributions have helped to clarify the issue. However, whereas the 
effects of central bank’s non-accommodation on interest rates is not disputed in the 
controversy between horizontalists and structuralists, it is by no means clear that commercial 
banks will necessarily raise loan rates in the face of increasing credit demand when it is 
supposed that the central bank accommodates. Lavoie (1996) argues that an increasing 
interest rate in the face of increasing economic activity and credit demand can only be 
attributed to central bank’s non-accommodation. And if central banks decide not to 
accommodate an increasing demand for reserves, this is tantamount to increasing the base rate 
of interest with the concomitant effects demonstrated in Figure 5. It is therefore the central 
bank’s interest rate policy which causes changes in the rate for reserves and in the loan rate.  
 14
Figure 5: A time framework explanation of endogenous money with incomplete 
accommodation of the central bank 
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Of course, it has to be conceded that the commercial banks’ loan rate may also vary 
when the central bank maintains the base rate at a constant level. Changes in the degree of 
competition in the banking sector, shifts in expectations and hence in liquidity preference or 
in risk assessments of commercial banks may be a cause for this. What is disputed from a 
macroeconomic perspective, however, is the necessity of an increase of the loan rate in the 
face of rising demand for credit, due to decreasing liquidity of commercial banks and 
increasing indebtedness of credit seeking firms (Lavoie 1996). We will examine the latter in a 
simple Kaleckian macroeconomic distribution and growth model in the following section. 
 
3. Interest rate and debt in a basic Kaleckian monetary distribution and growth model 
In this section we examine the effects of a change in firms’ inducement to accumulate on the 
debt-capital ratio of the firm sector within a Kaleckian monetary distribution and growth 
model, as proposed in Hein (2006).11 For this purpose we take the rate of interest as an 
exogenous variable, following the ‘horizontalist’ view, in order to see whether there is a 
consistent rise in our indicator for firms’ indebtedness, the debt-capital ratio, whenever the 
inducement to accumulate increases. If this were so, the horizontalist approach could indeed 
be considered to be only a single period approach, as argued by Fontana, and would have to 
be augmented by the arguments put forward by the structuralists. Rising indebtedness of the 
firm sector would therefore give rise to an increase in the loan rate of interest set by 
commercial banks due to increasing risk and liquidity premia. 
 
3.1 The basic model 
We assume a closed economy without economic activity of the state. Under given conditions 
of production, there is just one type of commodity produced that can be used for consumption 
and investment purposes. There is a constant relation between the employed volume of labour 
                                                 
11 See also Hein (2008, chapters 12 and 13). 
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and real output (Y), i.e. there is no overhead-labour and no technical change, so that we get a 
constant labour-output-ratio (l). The capital-potential output-ratio (v), the relation between the 
real capital stock (K) and potential real output (Yv), is also constant. The capital stock is 
assumed not to depreciate. The rate of capacity utilisation (u) is given by the relation between 
actual real output and potential real output. The basic model can be described by the 
following equations: 
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Writing w for the nominal wage rate, we assume that firms set prices (p) according to 
a mark-up (m) on constant unit labour costs up to full capacity output, with the mark-up being 
determined by the degree of price competition in the goods markets and by the relative 
powers of capital and labour in the labour market (equation 1).12 The profit share (h), i.e. the 
                                                 
12 In the present model we do not address the effects of distribution struggle on inflation and the 
related price, debt and investment dynamics but rather assume the level of prices to be constant and 
suppose that distribution conflict only affects the mark-up. See Hein (2006b, 2008, chapter 16) and 
Hein/Stockhammer (2010) for an extension of the present model to cover distribution conflict, 
inflation and real debt dynamics. 
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proportion of profits (Π) in nominal output (pY) is determined by the mark-up (equation 2). 
The mark-up and hence the profit share may become elastic with respect to the interest rate, 
because the mark-up has to cover interest costs of the firms. The profit rate (r) relates the 
annual flow of profits to the nominal capital stock (equation 3). 
The pace of accumulation is determined by the entrepreneurs’ decisions to invest. We 
assume that long-term finance is supplied only by retained earnings or by long-term credit of 
rentiers’ households (directly or through banks).13 Introducing interest payments into the 
model, profit splits into profit of enterprise (Πn) and rentiers’ income (Z) (equation 4). 
Rentiers’ income is determined by the stock of long-term credit (B) granted to firms and the 
exogenously given rate of interest (i), with the latter being mainly determined by central bank 
policies, as argued above. Equation (5) defines the debt-capital ratio (λ) as an indicator for 
firms’ indebtedness. 
We assume a classical saving hypothesis, i.e. workers do not save. The part of profits 
retained is completely saved by definition. The part of profits distributed to rentiers’ 
households (directly or through banks), i.e. the interest payments, is used by rentiers’ 
households according to their propensity to save (sz).
14 Therefore, total saving (S) comprises 
retained profits (Π-Z) and saving out of interest income (Sz). Taking equations (3), (4) and (5) 
into account, we get the saving rate (σ) in equation (6) which relates total saving to the 
nominal capital stock. 
Equation (7) for the accumulation rate (g) relating net investment (I) to the capital 
stock follows the arguments in Kalecki (1954). It is assumed that investment decisions are 
                                                 
13 The distinction between short-term finance for production purposes and long-term finance for 
investment purposes, not dealt with in the present chapter, can be found in the monetary circuit 
approach (Graziani 1989, 1994, Hein 2008, Lavoie 1992a, pp. 151-169, Seccareccia, 1996, 2003). 
14 In order to simplify the model we assume that there are no costs and no profits in banking and that 
commercial banks distribute the interest payments they receive from firms completely to the rentiers’ 
households. 
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positively affected by animal spirits (α), by expected sales and by retained earnings. Expected 
sales are determined by the rate of capacity utilisation. Retained earnings, in relation to the 
capital stock, are given by the difference between the rate of profit and the rate of interest 
times the debt-capital ratio. Therefore, the rate of interest and the debt-capital ratio both have 
a negative impact on investment because they adversely affect internal funds. This also limits 
the access to external funds on imperfect capital markets, according to Kalecki’s (1937) 
‘principle of increasing risk’. 
For analytical purposes we will distinguish between a short-run goods market 
equilibrium, for which we take the firms’ debt-capital ratio as given, and a medium-run 
equilibrium, for which the debt-capital ratio is determined endogenously. 
 
3.2 The short-run goods market equilibrium 
The goods market equilibrium is determined by the equality of saving and investment 
decisions in equation (8). The goods market stability condition in equation (9) requires that 
the saving rate responds more elastically to changes in capacity utilisation than capital 
accumulation does. In what follows we will assume that this condition is fulfilled. 
σ=g ,             (8) 
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Taking the debt-capital ratio as given in the short run, the goods market equilibrium 
values (*) for capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and the rate of profit are as follows: 
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3.3 The medium-run equilibrium 
In order to determine the medium-run equilibrium value for the debt-capital ratio and the rate 
of capital accumulation, we start with equation (5), and for simplicity we assume away 
inflation, i.e. the mark-up may change but not the price level. This implies – somewhat 
unrealistically – that nominal wages fall when mark-ups rise. For the growth rates of the 
variables it therefore follows from equation (5): 
gBˆKˆBˆˆ −=−=λ .          (13) 
Given our assumptions above, the additional credit granted in each period (L = ΔB) is 
equal to rentiers’ saving in this period: 
iBsSB ZZ ==Δ .          (14) 
For the growth rate of debt it follows: 
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B
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In equilibrium the endogenously determined debt-capital ratio has to be constant, i.e. 
. Integrating this condition into equation (13) and making use of equations (11) and (15) 
we get for the medium-run equilibrium value (**) of the debt-capital ratio: 
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This medium-run equilibrium will be stable, if 0
ˆ <λ∂
λ∂ . Making use of equation (13) 
and applying equations (11) and (15) yields: 
 20
( )
( ) β−τ−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ τ−−β−
=λ∂
λ∂
1
v
h
s
v
hs1iˆ ZZ
.         (17) 
From this it follows for the stability condition:15
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The medium-run equilibrium will hence tend to be stable, if the rentiers’ saving propensity is 
low and investment decisions are very elastic with respect to capacity utilisation but very 
inelastic with respect to internal funds. Stability of the debt-capital ratio requires that a rise in 
this ratio is accompanied by a rise in the rate of capital accumulation, because long run 
stability from equation (17’) is tantamount to 
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h
s
v
hs1i
*g ZZ >
β−τ−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ τ−−β
=λ∂
∂  derived from 
equation (11), assuming the interest rate to be positive and given.16 However, if the rentiers’ 
saving propensity is rather high and investment decisions are very inelastic with respect to 
demand but very elastic with respect to internal funds, the medium-run equilibrium debt-
capital ratio will tend to become unstable.17
For the medium-run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation which is associated with 
a constant debt-capital ratio ( ), we obtain from equations (13) and (15): 0ˆ =λ
is**g Z= .           (18) 
                                                 
15 Note, that the stability of the goods market equilibrium implies (h/v)(1-τ)-β > 0. 
16 And if 0*g >λ∂
∂
, this implies that 0
i
*g >∂
∂
, which is also derived from equation (11), and hence 
the ‘puzzling’ case in the face of a change in the rate of interest. For an extensive analysis of the 
effects of changes in the rate of interest on the goods market equilibrium and on the debt-capital ratio 
in this model see Hein (2006). 
17 The conditions for medium-run instability are associated with ‘normal’ negative effects of interest 
rate hikes on capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and the profit rate, as can be derived from 
equations (10) – (12). 
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This medium-run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation can be termed the ‘warranted rate’ 
(g**), because it is the rate of accumulation which is required for the constancy of the debt-
capital ratio. However, it is by no means guaranteed that the goods market equilibrium rate of 
capital accumulation (equation 11) will adjust to that rate: 
a) In the medium-run stable case, in which ( ) 0s
v
hs1 ZZ >τ−−β , a deviation of g* from g** 
will be self-correcting: If g* > g**, λ will fall according to equation (13) and this will feed 
back negatively on g* in equation (11), adjusting g* to g**. If g* < g**, λ will rise according 
to equation (13) and this will feed back positively on g* in equation (11), adjusting g* to g**.  
b) In the medium-run unstable case, in which ( ) 0s
v
hs1 ZZ <τ−−β , a deviation of g* from 
g** will cumulatively accelerate: If g* > g**, λ will fall according to equation (13) and this 
will feed back positively on g* in equation (11), making g* deviate even further from g**. If 
g* < g**, λ will rise according to equation (13) and this will feed back negatively on g* in 
equation (11), making g* deviate even further from g**.  
Our ‘warranted rate’ of accumulation is thus reminiscent of Harrod’s (1939) 
‘warranted rate of growth’. However, in our case it is neither related to the goods market 
equilibrium, nor to desired capacity utilisation, but to a constant debt-capital ratio of the firm 
sector. 
 
3.4 The effects of an increase in animal spirits 
Having so far outlined the model properties, we are now in a position to discuss the effects of 
a rise in firms’ inducement to accumulate which will be accompanied by an increase in the 
demand for investment finance and hence for credit. Let us assume that animal spirits (α) in 
the accumulation function (7) increase. This has positive effects on firms’ investment 
decisions and, with a given debt-capital ratio and stable goods market equilibria in the short 
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run, the increase in animal spirits will positively affect the short-run goods market equilibrium 
rate of capital accumulation in equation (11):18
( )
0
1
v
h
v
h
*g >
β−τ−
=α∂
∂
.         (19) 
Considering the medium-run effects on the debt-capital ratio we obtain from equation (16):  
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ τ−−β
−
=α∂
λ∂
ZZ sv
hs1i
v
h
** .        (20) 
For the discussion of the effects of increasing animal spirits on the debt-capital ratio 
we have to distinguish between the medium-run stable and the unstable case. For the medium-
run stable debt-capital ratio we have ( ) 0s
v
hs1 ZZ >τ−−β  and hence: 
( )
0
s
v
hs1i
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h
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ZZ
<
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ τ−−β
−
=α∂
λ∂ .        (20’) 
For the medium-run unstable case we have ( ) 0s
v
hs1 ZZ <τ−−β  and hence: 
( )
0
s
v
hs1i
v
h
**
ZZ
>
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ τ−−β
−
=α∂
λ∂ .        (20’’) 
Finally, we obtain for the overall effect of an increase in animal spirits on the medium-
run equilibrium capital accumulation, the warranted rate of accumulation, from equation (18): 
0
**g =α∂
∂ .           (21) 
                                                 
18 Also the effects of an increase in animal spirits on the goods market equilibrium rates of capacity 
utilisation and profit in equations (10) and (12) are positive, if the debt-capital ratio is taken as given 
and only stable goods market equilibria are considered. 
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The warranted rate of growth therefore remains unaffected by a change in animal spirits. 
As equation (20’) shows, in the medium-run stable regime an increase in animal spirits 
and in the short-run goods market equilibrium rate of capital accumulation will be associated 
with a decrease in the medium-run equilibrium debt-capital ratio. Firms’ indebtedness will not 
be increasing but decreasing in this case. We will see, at least temporarily in the process 
towards the new medium-run equilibrium, a macroeconomic ‘paradox of debt’, i.e. rising 
rates of capital accumulation and falling debt-capital ratios.19 Therefore, there is no reason to 
assume that the loan rate of interest will increase in this case. However, the decrease in the 
debt-capital ratio will finally feed back negatively on the goods market equilibrium rate of 
growth which will adjust to the unchanged warranted rate of growth. 
For the medium-run unstable case equation (20’’) shows that an increase in animal 
spirits and in the short-run goods market equilibrium rate of capital accumulation will be 
associated with a rising medium-run equilibrium debt-capital ratio. Therefore, this seems to 
be a case for a rising loan rate of interest due to increased firms’ indebtedness. However, the 
instability of the medium-run debt-capital ratio in this case, discussed in the previous section, 
has to be taken into account. Let us assume that the economy is initially in medium-run 
equilibrium by a fluke. An increase in the equilibrium debt-capital ratio in the face of 
increasing animal spirits means that the actual debt-capital ratio will fall short of the new 
equilibrium. This will cause further deviations of the actual from the equilibrium debt-capital 
ratio and thus falling debt-capital ratios. Simultaneously, the increase in animal spirits will 
make the goods market equilibrium rate of capital accumulation exceed the warranted rate of 
accumulation. The rate of accumulation will therefore cumulatively deviate from the 
warranted rate. The disequilibrium process will thus be characterised by the macroeconomic 
‘paradox of debt’: rising rates of capital accumulation will be accompanied by falling debt-
                                                 
19 On the ‘paradox of debt’ in Kaleckian distribution and growth models see Steindl (1952, pp. 113-
122), Dutt (1995), Lavoie (1995) and Hein (2006a, 2007, 2008). 
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capital ratios. Again, rising capital accumulation will not be associated with rising firms’ 
indebtedness and hence there is no reason for rising loan rates of interest if we take a 
macroeconomic perspective on the matter. 
 
4. Conclusions 
We have reviewed the main arguments put forward against the horizontalist view of 
endogenous credit and money and an exogenous rate of interest under the control of monetary 
policies. We have argued that the structuralist arguments put forward in favour of an 
endogenously increasing interest rate when investment and economic activity are rising, due 
to increasing indebtedness of the firm sector or decreasing liquidity in the commercial bank 
sector, raise major doubts from a macroeconomic perspective. Therefore, we have examined 
the effect of an increasing inducement to accumulate on the debt-capital ratio of the firm 
sector in a simple Kaleckian distribution and growth model. We have shown that the model 
does not generate a stable positive relationship between capital accumulation and firms’ 
indebtedness which could give rise to endogenously increasing loan rates of interest due to 
rising risk and liquidity premia of banks and monetary wealth holders. On the contrary, rising 
(falling) capital accumulation may be associated with a falling (rising) debt-capital ratio for 
the economy as a whole and hence with the macroeconomic ‘paradox of debt’.  
From the perspective of Kalecki’s (1937) ‘principle of increasing risk’, for the 
individual firm increasing demand for credit may be associated with increasing indebtedness 
and hence increasing lender’s and borrower’s risk which may cause an increase in the loan 
rate of interest from a microeconomic perspective. However, from a macroeconomic 
perspective increasing spending of firms financed by means of credit means increasing 
investment and hence also increasing realized profits. Therefore, an increasing debt-capital 
ratio for the firm sector as a whole is by no means necessary. On the contrary, if the ‘paradox 
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of debt’ prevails Kalecki’s ‘principle of increasing risk’ will become irrelevant at the 
macroeconomic level, as was already noticed by Kalecki (1937) himself. 
A similar argument as for firms’ indebtedness applies to the liquidity position of 
commercial banks when credit supply is increased (Lavoie 1996). An increase in long-term 
loans relative to short-term deposits does not necessarily cause rising loan rates due to the 
perceived problem of decreasing liquidity on part of the commercial banks. Rising loans mean 
rising deposits, the spending of which will remain within the banking sector. Individual banks 
may face liquidity constraints, but the banking sector as a whole will not, as long as the 
demand for central bank money remains constant. However, increasing credit may be 
associated with increasing demand for central bank money, too. In this case commercial banks 
will face liquidity problems, if the central bank is not willing to accommodate increasing 
demand for reserves at a given rate of interest, and the loan rate of interest will have to rise. 
This increase in interest rates, however, is caused by central bank policies and not by the 
commercial bank sector. It is tantamount to an increase in the central bank’s base rate, that is 
an upwards shift in the central bank’s horizontal supply curve of reserves. 
Summing up, the treatment of the rate of interest as an exogenous macroeconomic 
distribution parameter in Post-Keynesian distribution and growth models seems to be well 
founded. The central bank determines the base rate of interest and, with the degree of 
competition in the banking sector, expectations, liquidity preference and hence commercial 
banks’ mark-up constant, the central bank also determines the loan rate of interest. Of course, 
expectations and liquidity preferences may change in the process of time, and thus may the 
spread between the base rate and the loan rate. And if sudden increases in liquidity 
preferences occur, they may limit the capacities of the central bank to lower loan rates of 
interest in the short run. And there may also be short-run inversions in the yield curves, as is 
usually witnessed in economic recessions. However, there is no reason to believe in a 
necessary increase of liquidity and risk premia when economic activity and the volume of 
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credit expand, and hence there is no reason to necessarily believe in rising credit supply 
curves in the macroeconomic interest rate loan space. 
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